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Introduction
In 1977, Jerry Hartfield, a black man with an IQ of fifty-one, was
charged with raping and murdering a white woman.1 A jury quickly
sentenced Hartfield to death, but he appealed.2 Three years later, the

1.

Andrew Cohen, Held Without Retrial for 11,800 Days, Texas Inmate Still
Waits for Justice, The Atlantic (Jan. 7, 2013), http://www.
theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/01/held-without-retrial-for-11-800days-texas-inmate-still-waits-for-justice/266865/ [https://perma.cc/6ZWMMJFB].

2.

Id.
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Texas Court of Criminal Appeals unanimously reversed Hartfield’s conviction because the jury was tainted.3 While Hartfield awaited trial, the
governor of Texas—with encouragement by prison officials—commuted
Hartfield’s sentence from the death penalty to life in prison.4 At that
point, Hartfield’s state-appointed attorney ceased representing
Hartfield.5 Although Hartfield was entitled to a new trial, he proceeded
to spend twenty-three years in prison until a fellow inmate noticed the
mistake.6
The inmate told Hartfield that he should have received a new trial
when his case was reversed.7 Hartfield then began filing pro se petitions
for a writ of habeas corpus in district court.8 In response, the court
appointed a public defender to help with the case.9 Hartfield—with aid
from his attorney—then began petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus
in state court and was eventually denied by the Texas Court of Appeals
in 2014.10 Hartfield argued that the thirty-four year pretrial delay
caused by governmental negligence violated his constitutional right to
a speedy trial.11 The trial court concluded that the delay was extraordinary, that it was caused by governmental negligence, and that the
thirty years of pretrial incarceration prejudiced the defendant, but it
refused to find that a speedy trial violation had occurred because
Hartfield’s twenty-three years of acquiescence weighed heavily against
him.12 Again, Hartfield appealed.13
On appeal, the state argued, “While the Barker balancing test
contains few if any absolutes, Appellant’s twenty-three year delay in
3.

Id.

4.

Deborah Hastings, Texas Inmate Must Stay in Prison, Despite Conviction
Being Overturned in 1980, N.Y. Daily News (Apr. 18, 2014, 1:50 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/texas-inmate-conviction-over
turned-1980-behind-bars-article-1.1761084 [https://perma.cc/MZ9M-Y9SL].

5.

Id.

6.

Michael Gracyzk, Jerry Hartfield Should Be Freed After Being Wrongfully
Locked Up For Decades: Lawyers, The Huffington Post (Feb. 14, 2014,
5:22
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/14/jerry-hartfield
_n_4791122.html [https://perma.cc/5JWU-RLMD].

7.

Id.

8.

See Ex parte Hartfield, 442 S.W.3d 805, 807 (Tex. App. 2014) (denying
pretrial habeas relief).

9.

Id. at 810.

10.

Id. at 817.

11.

Amended Brief for Appellant at 3, Ex parte Hartfield, 442 S.W.3d 805 (Tex.
App. 2014) (No. 13-14-00238-CV).

12.

Ex parte Hartfield, 442 S.W.3d 805, 811 n.5 (Tex. App. 2014).

13.

Id. at 811.
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invoking his right to a new and speedy trial comes close to absolutely
barring a finding that the right to speedy trial was violated during the
relevant period.”14 The court acknowledged that Hartfield’s case may
have been the longest gap in any speedy trial case15 but refused to reach
the issue because of procedural technicalities.16 On remand, Hartfield
was reconvicted of crimes he allegedly committed over three decades
prior.17 Hartfield’s case demonstrates a major flaw with speedy trial
jurisprudence.18 It is unjust to deny an ignorant and unrepresented
defendant his constitutional right just because he was unaware of his
duty to demand it from the court.
This Note argues that courts’ misapplication of the “assertion
factor” in the Barker speedy trial test has created problems in speedy
trial jurisprudence.19 Courts’ reliance on the “assertion factor” has fostered an unfair bias against dismissal of speedy trial cases in lower
courts, allowed the courts to apply doctrine discredited by the U.S.
Supreme Court, and distorted the intention of the constitutional right
to a speedy trial. This Note proposes that courts can solve these
problems by eliminating the assertion factor from speedy trial analysis.
Instead, courts should apply a three-part test composed of the remaining Barker factors.
This Note begins in Part I with a discussion of the historic background and policy considerations of the constitutional speedy trial
right. Part II explains the Barker test and the assertion factor’s role.
Part III addresses problems created by the Barker test’s assertion
factor. Part IV discusses some potential ways of reinterpreting the
Barker test in order to mitigate the problems addressed in Part III.

I.

Background and Policy of Sixth Amendment
Right to Speedy Trial

The right to a speedy trial has a long history and deep-rooted policy
concerns for protecting the accused from unwanted harms caused by
14.

State’s Brief at 53, Ex parte Hartfield, 442 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. App. 2014)
(No. 13-14-00240-CR) (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972)).

15.

Hartfield, 442 S.W.3d at 808.

16.

Id. at 813 (“In other words, an alleged violation of a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial cannot be raised by pretrial habeas
because a ruling on such an issue is not entitled to interlocutory review.”).

17.

Matt Ford, The Retrial of a Texas Man Imprisoned Despite an Overturned
Conviction, The Atlantic (Aug. 20, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com
/national/archive/2015/08/the-retrial-of-a-texas-man-imprisoned-despitehis-overturned-conviction/401876/ [https://perma.cc/492A-TM3W].

18.

Hartfield’s case was resolved on the habeas issue, so the Court never discussed the speedy trial issue. Hartfield, 442 S.W.3d at 817.

19.

See infra Part III.B (discussing the Barker test).
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pre-trial incarceration.20 Courts have tried to balance those harms with
concerns for the difficulties prosecutors face in bringing defendants to
trial.21 Balancing these concerns caused courts to form policies that
make it extremely difficult for defendants to find relief for speedy trial
violations.
A.

History of Speedy Trial Jurisprudence

On its face, the Sixth Amendment sets simple guidelines for protecting the criminally accused: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.”22 Despite centuries
of speedy trial jurisprudence, however, courts have provided little guidance for determining what constitutes a “speedy trial” and when a
defendant’s constitutional right is violated.23 One reason for the lack of
clarity is the trifling legislative history of the right.24 Scholars claim that
history provides little explanation of why the framers decided to include
the language in the Bill of Rights or of the framers’ intended application.25 Consequently, historic English trial rights have been used to interpret the language in the Sixth Amendment.26 Considering the importance of history, the U.S. Supreme Court held, “the right to a speedy
trial is as fundamental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth
Amendment. That right has its roots at the very foundation of our
English law heritage.”27
The constitutional framers’ most direct legislative influence on
rights of the accused was the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.28 Yet, the
timing concerns of the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 focused on curing
the problem of unlawfully detained prisoners, so it is unclear whether
20.

See infra Part II (discussing the history and policy concerns).

21.

See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 527–30 (1972) (explaining the need for a
balancing test).

22.

U.S. Const. amend. VI.

23.

See infra Part III (discussing application of the Barker test).

24.

See Susan N. Herman, The Right to a Speedy and Public Trial: A
Reference Guide to the United States Constitution 161–67 (Jack
Stark ed., 2006) (explaining the historical origins of the right to a speedy
trial).

25.

Id. at 166–67.

26.

Id.; see also Alan L. Schneider, Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 20
Stan. L. Rev. 476, 484 (1968) (“This paucity of historical data makes it
difficult to ascertain the intent of the framers when they enacted the
federal speedy-trial guarantee. Given this fact, it seems reasonable to
construe the guarantee in light of the common-law sources from which the
framers derived their legal education.”).

27.

Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223 (1967).

28.

Id.
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the act provided the foundation for the broader language of the Sixth
Amendment.29 Scholars theorize that the inspiration for the framers to
include the right to a speedy trial in the Bill of Rights may have come
from the work of Sir Edward Coke.30 Coke’s influential seventeenthcentury treatise “endors[ed] the principle that a right to speedy disposition was a significant component of justice.”31 However, Coke was one
of the only voices emphasizing the need for speedy trials at the time,
making it unclear how much English parliament thought about these
concerns when it enacted the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679.32 Therefore,
the full extent of Coke’s ideas over the language of the Sixth
Amendment remains unclear.33
One clue about the policy interests behind the speedy trial language
of the Sixth Amendment is a record of the majority of state delegates
rejecting a proposed amendment to the language by Representative
Burke of South Carolina.34 Burke proposed language that would allow
a defendant to delay trial if needed to help his case,35 but the vast
majority of delegates rejected Representative Burke’s proposal on the
theory that the established processes of the justice system would be
sufficient to ensure defendants’ ability to make their cases.36 Therefore,
the founders may have intended the speedy trial clause to be minimally
intrusive.
Despite the ambiguous origins of the right to a speedy trial, the
United States Supreme Court has managed to establish some guidelines
for Sixth Amendment speedy trial jurisprudence. In Klopfer v. North
Carolina,37 the petitioner was indicted for criminal trespass, but never
convicted because of a mistrial.38 After his trial was postponed, Klopfer
29.

See 31 Car. 2, c. 2 (1679) (“For the prevention whereof and the more speedy
Releife of all persons imprisoned for any such criminall or supposed criminal
Matters . . . .”).

30.

Herman, supra note 24, at 164; see Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 225 (“Coke’s
Institutes were read in the American Colonies by virtually every student of
the law. Indeed, Thomas Jefferson wrote that at the time he studied law
(1762–1767), ‘Coke Lyttleton was the universal elementary book of law
students.’ And to John Rutledge of South Carolina, the Institutes seemed
‘to be almost the foundation of our law.’ To Coke, in turn, Magna Carta was
one of the fundamental bases of English liberty.” (footnotes omitted)).

31.

Herman, supra note 24, at 162.

32.

Id. at 163–64.

33.

Id. at 164–67.

34.

Id. at 166–67.

35.

Id.

36.

Id. at 167.

37.

386 U.S. 213 (1967).

38.

Id. at 217.
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petitioned the court to ascertain when his case would be heard.39 At
that point, the state prosecutor asked for a “nolle prosequi with leave,”
a local rule that allowed a defendant to go free but obligated him to
return to trial at an undetermined future date.40 The Supreme Court
found North Carolina’s nolle prosequi rule “clearly denie[d] the petitioner the right to a speedy trial,” which the Court declared was fundamental.41 Therefore, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to
a speedy trial applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.42
One of the earliest cases to address how to apply the right to a
speedy trial was Beavers v. Haubert.43 In Beavers, the defendant faced
two separate indictments under federal attempted bribery statutes, but
did not comply with a removal warrant requiring him to appear in a
different district than the one in which the case originated.44 On appeal,
the U.S. Supreme Court considered how speedy trial rights should be
applied to a defendant facing multiple charges.45 Instead of making a
hard ruling of when and how the right to a speedy trial attaches, the
Beavers court considered the circumstances surrounding the defendant
and made a ruling based on balancing the defendant’s needs and the
practical concerns of local courts in managing the proceedings.46 The
Court held, “The right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is
consistent with delays and depends upon circumstances. It secures
rights to a defendant. It does not preclude the rights of public justice.”47
Beavers demonstrates why courts have had difficulty setting firm guidelines on when and how to apply the right to a speedy trial. Since the
right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative, courts examine the circumstances surrounding each individual case in order to determine whether
a lengthy pre-trial delay was reasonable.
39.

Id. at 218.

40.

Id.

41.

Id. at 222–23 (“We hold here that the right to a speedy trial is as
fundamental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment. That
right has its roots at the very foundation of our English law heritage. Its first
articulation in modern jurisprudence appears to have been made in Magna
Carta (1215), wherein it was written, ‘We will sell to no man, we will not
deny or defer to any man either justice or right’; but evidence of recognition
of the right to speedy justice in even earlier times is found in the Assize of
Clarendon (1166).” (footnote omitted)).

42.

Id. at 222.

43.

198 U.S. 77 (1905).

44.

Id. at 78.

45.

Id. at 86.

46.

Id. at 87.

47.

Id.
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Despite the ad hoc considerations prescribed in Beavers, the U.S.
Supreme Court has managed to set some parameters on applying the
right to a speedy trial. For instance, the Court determined that the
meaning of “accused” in the Sixth Amendment requires some formal
action by the government, and thus the right to a speedy trial attaches
upon the arrest of a criminal defendant.48 Further, the Court held that
only periods where charges are pending should count toward a speedy
trial violation in cases involving multiple proceedings and reinstatements.49 The Court has also held that the only adequate remedy for a
speedy trial violation is dismissal.50 However, Chief Justice Burger
reasoned, “[p]erhaps the severity of that remedy has caused courts to
be extremely hesitant in finding a failure to afford a speedy trial. Be
that as it may, we know of no reason why less drastic relief may not be
granted in appropriate cases.”51 The innate need for balancing competing interests in criminal cases, and the strict remedy of dismissal, has
made courts reluctant to grant relief to defendants and led to inconsistent decisions in lower courts.52 This has caused a great deal of pain
and confusion for defendants seeking relief for speedy trial violations.
B.

Policy Considerations and the “Demand-Waiver Rule”

The Supreme Court has emphasized concern for harms to defendants caused by waiting for trial,53 but has held that courts need to
balance those concerns with concerns for allowing the criminal justice
48.

See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321 (1971) (“Invocation of the
speedy trial provision thus need not await indictment, information, or other
formal charge. But we decline to extend the reach of the amendment to the
period prior to arrest.” (footnote omitted)).

49.

Herman, supra note 24, at 219; see United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S.
302, 317 (1986) (holding that delay attributable to interlocutory appeals
did not count for defendants’ speedy trial claim).

50.

See Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 438 (1973) (“The remedy for a
violation of this constitutional right has traditionally been the dismissal of
the indictment or the vacation of the sentence.”).

51.

Id. Legal scholars have criticized dismissal as a remedy for speedy trial
violations. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Constitution and
Criminal Procedure: First Principles 98–100 (1997) (discussing how
dismissal does not properly relieve innocent defendants and grants a
windfall to guilty defendants).

52.

See Herman, supra note 24, at 230 (“The reluctance of courts to invoke the
‘severe remedy’ of dismissal unquestionably has an impact on the willingness
of courts to find a constitutional violation . . . .”).

53.

United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966) (“This guarantee is an
important safeguard to prevent undue and oppressive incarceration prior to
trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accompanying public accusation and
to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused
to defend himself.”).
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system time to function properly.54 Unfortunately, the balance is not
always easy to strike and can result in defendants waiting long periods
of time prior to trial, and being deprived of their constitutional right.55
Although there is clearly a need to be practical when creating criminal
prosecution policy, speedy trial jurisprudence has heavily distorted the
meaning of the constitutional language prescribing the right.
The plain meaning and courts’ interpretations of the Sixth
Amendment suggest that the right only applies to defendants who are
formally “accused,” which the Court interpreted to mean arrested.56
According to Akhil Amar, the right to a speedy trial was intended to
protect defendants specifically because they are accused.57 Once a
person is formally accused, that person faces the harms of being detained and having their reputation damaged.58 The speedy trial clause was
likely intended to mitigate these harms, especially for the falsely
accused.59 Further, the right protects innocent defendants from being
detained indefinitely by a tyrannical government that refuses to hold
trial. Yet, when applying the right to a speedy trial, courts have consistently balanced the interests of the public, the defendant, and the
criminal justice system.60 This pragmatic approach to determining
whether speedy trial rights are violated is somewhat necessary, given
the wide range of complications involved in criminal prosecution.61
Therefore, these concerns led to the creation of flexible speedy trial tests

54.

United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971).

55.

See supra Introduction (discussing the case of Jerry Hartfield).

56.

Marion, 404 U.S. at 313 (“On its face, the protection of the Amendment is
activated only when a criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to
those persons who have been ‘accused’ in the course of that prosecution.
These provisions would seem to afford no protection to those not yet
accused . . . .”); Amar, supra note 51, at 102–03 (discussing how the Sixth
Amendment is “accusation-based”).

57.

Amar, supra note 51 at 102.

58.

Id. at 102–03.

59.

See Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 41 (1970) (“It is intended to spare an
accused those penalties and disabilities—incompatible with the presumption
of innocence—that may spring from delay in the criminal process.”).

60.

See supra Part II.A (detailing the ambiguous reasons the framers included
the language in the Bill of Rights and courts’ historical application of the
right).

61.

See Dickey, 398 U.S. at 43 (“A criminal prosecution has many stages, and
delay may occur during or between any of them.”); see also H. Richard
Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets a Fast Shuffle, 72 Colum. L.
Rev. 1376, 1384 (1972) (“[D]elay-provoking circumstances are rarely related
to the nature of the charges alone.”).
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that consider various facets of a defendant’s case.62 The benefit of a
flexible test comes with the cost of eliminating the guarantee of the
right to a speedy trial. For example, by applying a balancing test, a
court can find that the length of delay between a defendant’s arrest and
trial is so long that the defendant has not “enjoyed the right to a speedy
and public trial,” but not grant relief because there are preemptive
countervailing interests.63 Additionally, courts share Representative
Burke’s concerns over the dangers of a criminal justice system that
moves too swiftly.64 For example, in United States v. Ewell,65 the U.S.
Supreme Court held, “[a] requirement of unreasonable speed would have
a deleterious effect both upon the rights of the accused and upon the
ability of society to protect itself. Therefore . . . ‘[t]he right of a speedy
trial is necessarily relative.’”66 Courts’ concerns for these underlying
policy considerations and desire to stay true to the Constitution have
led to inconsistent speedy trial jurisprudence.
The Court’s declaration that the right to a speedy trial is fundamental led to fear of defendants who acquiesce to—or intentionally
cause—procedural delays while awaiting trial and then subsequently
claim to have their speedy trial right violated.67 This concern likely
helped form what courts have termed the “demand doctrine,” or
“demand-waiver rule.”68 Under the “demand-waiver rule,” if a defendant does not make a timely demand for a speedy trial, the defendant
waives his or her constitutional right.69 The “demand-waiver rule” was
intended to prevent guilty defendants who benefit from trial delays
from using the constitutional right to get their cases dismissed based
62.

See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 525–33 (1972) (describing the demandwaiver rule and creating a balancing test).

63.

See State v. Parker, 296 P.3d 54, 62 (Ariz. 2013) (denying speedy trial
violation despite a three-year and nine-month delay between arrest and trial
because the pretrial incarceration did not prejudice the defendant’s case).

64.

United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966).

65.

383 U.S. 116 (1966).

66.

Id. at 120.

67.

See Barker, 407 U.S. at 526 (“[C]ourts that have applied the demand-waiver
rule have relied on the assumption that delay usually works for the benefit of
the accused and on the absence of any readily ascertainable time in the
criminal process for a defendant to be given the choice of exercising or waiving
his right.”).

68.

Different jurisdictions refer to the rule as either “demand-waiver rule” or the
“demand doctrine.” This Note will use the term “demand-waiver rule.” See
e.g., United States v. Sanchez, 361 F.2d 824, 825 (2d Cir. 1966) (“Moreover,
the right to a speedy trial after arrest or indictment is deemed waived unless
promptly asserted.”); United States ex rel. Pizarro v. Fay, 353 F.2d 726, 727
(2d Cir. 1965) (holding the same).

69.

Sanchez, 361 F.2d at 825.
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on a technicality.70 However, the rigidness of the “demand-waiver rule”
allowed courts to unjustly deny deserving defendants the full benefits
of right to a speedy trial. In the seminal case, Barker v. Wingo,71 the
U.S. Supreme Court addressed this problem.

II. The Barker Test and Defendants’ Assertion of the
Right to a Speedy Trial
In Barker v. Wingo, the Supreme Court rejected the rigid demandwaiver rule, but still emphasized the need to consider defendants’ assertion of the right to a speedy trial.72 Promoting this policy, the Court
established a four-factor balancing test that has become the quintessential test courts apply when determining whether defendants have
been deprived of the constitutional right to a speedy trial.73 This conflicting ideology has led to inconsistent application of the Barker test
by lower courts, and created difficulties for defendants trying to find
relief for speedy trial violations.
A.

Rejection of the “Demand-Waiver Rule”

In Barker, the defendant was indicted along with Silas Manning for
beating an elderly couple to death with a tire iron.74 The state found it
necessary to use Manning’s testimony in order to convict Barker, so it
had the court schedule Barker’s trial to occur after Manning’s.75 However, over the course of four years, the state brought five trials before
convicting Manning due to two hung juries, an illegal search, and a
venue change.76 Meanwhile, the state made sixteen motions for continuance to postpone Barker’s trial, while awaiting Manning’s conviction.77
At his trial, Barker moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that his
constitutional right to a speedy trial had been violated.78 The trial court
70.

See Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 Colum. L. Rev. 846,
853 (1957) (“This ‘demand doctrine’ stresses that the right to speedy trial is
not designed as a sword for defendant’s escape, but rather as a shield for his
protection. The courts reason that requiring demand will accomplish this
purpose since it will lead toward trial on the merits and not to a technical
evasion of the charge. A strong minority, however, rejects the ‘demand
doctrine’ . . . .”).

71.

407 U.S. 514 (1972).

72.

Id. at 528.

73.

See id. at 527–30 (explaining the need for a four-factor balancing test).

74.

Id. at 516.

75.

Id.

76.

Id. at 516–17.

77.

Id. at 517.

78.

Id. at 518.
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denied the motion and the Sixth Circuit affirmed based on the
“demand-waiver rule.”79 On review, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed
Barker’s conviction because Barker did not demonstrate he wanted a
trial, but rejected the “demand-waiver rule” as being “insensitive to a
right . . . deemed fundamental.”80 The Court reasoned that fundamental rights require an affirmative action to trigger waiver, and the
“demand-waiver rule” negated this requirement.81 In addition, the rigid
adherence to a “demand-waiver rule” would force some defendants to
make a choice whether to accept some possibly advantageous delay at
the cost of forgoing later relief for a speedy trial violation.82 According
to Justice Powell, this would put the government at a significant advantage.83
After rejecting the “demand-waiver rule” for being too unfair to
criminal defendants, the Barker Court emphasized the importance of
balancing interests in determining whether a defendant’s right to a
speedy trial has been violated.84 The Court reasoned that there are
societal interests in providing speedy trials, separate from rights of the
accused.85 Justice Powell concluded that societal interests in speedy
trials include: limiting the backlog of cases in urban courts, preventing
persons released on bond from having the opportunity to commit other
79.

Id.

80.

Id. at 529–30.

81.

Id. at 525 (“Such an approach, by presuming waiver of a fundamental right
from inaction, is inconsistent with this Court’s pronouncements on waiver of
constitutional rights.”).

82.

See id. at 527 (“It is also noteworthy that such a rigid view of the demandwaiver rule places defense counsel in an awkward position. Unless he
demands a trial early and often, he is in danger of frustrating his client’s
right. If counsel is willing to tolerate some delay because he finds it
reasonable and helpful in preparing his own case, he may be unable to obtain
a speedy trial for his client at the end of that time.”). The American Bar
Association also advocated for rejecting the demand-waiver rule, claiming it
unfairly impacts defendants. Id. at 528 n.28 (“The American Bar Association
also rejects the rigid demand-waiver rule: ‘One reason for this position is that
there are a number of situations, such as where the defendant is unaware of
the charge or where the defendant is without counsel, in which it is unfair
to require a demand . . . . Jurisdictions with a demand requirement are faced
with the continuing problem of defining exceptions, a process which has not
always been carried out with uniformity . . . . More important, the demand
requirement is inconsistent with the public interest in prompt disposition of
criminal cases. . . . [T]he trial of a criminal case should not be unreasonably
delayed merely because the defendant does not think that it is in his best
interest to seek prompt disposition of the charge.’”).

83.

Id. at 527–28.

84.

Id. at 530.

85.

Id. at 519.
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crimes, mitigating temptation for the accused to jump bail and escape,
and reducing the monetary costs of lengthy pre-trial detention.86 Powell
also considered harm to defendants:
The time spent in jail awaiting trial has a detrimental impact on
the individual. It often means loss of a job; it disrupts family life;
and it enforces idleness. Most jails offer little or no recreational
or rehabilitative programs. The time spent in jail is simply dead
time. Moreover, if a defendant is locked up, he is hindered in his
ability to gather evidence, contact witnesses, or otherwise prepare
his defense. Imposing those consequences on anyone who has not
yet been convicted is serious. It is especially unfortunate to impose them on those persons who are ultimately found to be innocent. Finally, even if an accused is not incarcerated prior to trial,
he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his liberty and by living
under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion, and often hostility.87

However, the Barker Court considered that a delay may actually work
to a defendant’s advantage by weakening the prosecution’s case, and
held that a delay does not per se prejudice the accused’s ability to
defend himself.88 Based on these notions, the Barker Court created the
balancing test that has become a common standard courts apply when
determining whether defendants are deprived of the constitutional right
to a speedy trial.89
B.

Overview of the Barker Test

In Barker, the Court considered the circumstantial nature of speedy
trial violations and determined that applying an ad hoc balancing test
is best way of ensuring justice.90 In creating the test, Justice Powell
determined four factors the court would consider.91 The four factors—
which this Note refers to as the “Barker factors”—are: (1) the length
of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the defendant’s assertion
of his or her right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant.92 In his opinion,

86.

Id. at 519–20.

87.

Id. at 532–33.

88.

Id. at 521.

89.

Id. at 530.

90.

Id.

91.

Id.

92.

Id.
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Justice Powell was clear about leaving room for discretion when deciding future speedy trial cases.93 Further, the opinion contradictorily rejected the “demand-waiver rule” because it unfairly prejudiced defendants, while holding that defendants must clearly show they wanted a
speedy trial in order to take advantage of the right.94
The consequence of the Barker court’s broad language and conflicting ideas has been widely varying application of the Barker test.95
Courts generally only dismiss cases for speedy trial violations if three
of the four Barker factors weigh in favor of a defendant.96 Yet, “[t]he
complex nature of the Barker v. Wingo balancing test makes it impossible to evaluate the courts’ results for consistency.”97 Commentators
have expressed a variety of concerns about how courts misapply the
Barker factors to the detriment of defendants.98 While there are numerous legitimate concerns, this Note narrowly focuses on the third factor
of the test, considering the consequences of allowing courts to use the
nature of defendants’ assertion of the right to a speedy trial in determining whether to dismiss cases.
C.

The Defendant’s Assertion of His or Her Right to a Speedy Trial

In Barker, Justice Powell cautioned that the “demand-waiver rule”
could lead to an “automatic, pro forma demand made immediately after
the appointment of counsel . . . .”99 However, Justice Powell was clear
that the Court still believes that defendants have a responsibility to
demand the right to a speedy trial.100 He reasoned that including the
defendant’s assertion or failure to assert his or her right as a factor in
93.

See id. at 536 (“We do not hold that there may never be a situation in
which an indictment may be dismissed on speedy trial grounds where the
defendant has failed to object to continuances.”).

94.

See id. at 528–36 (rejecting the demand-waiver rule, but then holding that
the defendant’s lack of effort to demand trial should be heavily weighed
against him).

95.

See 21A Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 933 (2016) (discussing a variety of
cases involving applications of the Barker test); see also infra Part IV
(discussing some of these cases in detail).

96.

Herman, supra note 24, at 223.

97.

Id. at 222.

98.

Id.

99.

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 528 (1972) (“The result in practice is likely
to be either an automatic, pro forma demand made immediately after
appointment of counsel or delays which, but for the demand-waiver rule,
would not be tolerated. Such a result is not consistent with the interests of
defendants, society, or the Constitution.”).

100. Id. (“We reject, therefore, the rule that a defendant who fails to demand a
speedy trial forever waives his right. This does not mean, however, that the
defendant has no responsibility to assert his right.”).
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the balancing test would promote fairness by giving the court
flexibility.101
It would permit, for example, a court to attach a different weight
to a situation in which the defendant knowingly fails to object from a
situation in which his attorney acquiesces in long delay without adequately informing his client, or from a situation in which no counsel is
appointed. “It would also allow a court to weigh the frequency and force
of the objections as opposed to attaching significant weight to a purely
pro forma objection.”102
Further, Justice Powell made it clear that the court wanted to
maintain constitutional principles and precedent that require defendants to take an affirmative action in order to waive fundamental rights
protected by the Constitution.103 However, he distinguished the right to
a speedy trial from other fundamental rights: “[T]he right to a speedy
trial is unique in its uncertainty as to when and under what circumstances it must be asserted or may be deemed waived.”104 Adding to the
confusion, the Court stressed, “[t]he defendant’s assertion of his speedy
trial right, then, is entitled to strong evidentiary weight . . . that failure
to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to prove that
he was denied a speedy trial.”105 The contradictory language of the
Barker opinion has led to inconsistency, confusion, and abuse by lower
courts in decisions regarding speedy trial violations.
Courts have interpreted the Barker test to mean that defendants
must make a “reasonable assertion” of a right to a speedy trial.106 Courts
determine whether a defendant has made a “reasonable assertion” by
considering the circumstances surrounding the case. Courts consider
whether the defendant is represented by legal counsel, whether the
defendant communicates with her counsel, whether counsel makes a
formal demand or complaint, what form the demand complaint is in,
and if the defendant makes a demand to the court pro se.107 Effectively,
courts attempt to determine how badly a defendant wanted a speedy
trial based on the form of her invocation of the right. For example,
courts give a great deal of weight to objections to prosecutors’ motions

101. Id. at 528–29.
102. Id. at 529 (emphasis added).
103. Id.; supra text accompanying note 76.
104. Barker, 407 U.S. 514 at 529.
105. Id. at 531–32.
106. See Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Pemberton, 813 F.2d 626, 629 (3d Cir. 1987)
(finding the defendant was obligated to make a “reasonable assertion of his
speedy trial right” in light of Barker v. Wingo).
107. Brian R. Means, Postconviction Remedies § 38:7 (2016); 23 C.J.S.
Criminal Procedure and Rights of Accused § 803 (2016).
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for continuance.108 Courts have also determined that a defendant can
assert the right to a speedy trial either by communication to prosecution, or communication to the court, but give more weight to communications made directly to the court.109 Courts are generally more
flexible when deciding cases in which a defendant has articulated a
demand without the assistance of counsel.110 For example, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals held that a defendant’s repeated requests to
secure counsel, out of fear of losing evidence, was helpful in constituting
a demand for a speedy trial.111
When deciding whether to acknowledge that a defendant made an
assertion, courts look at the context of “the assertion” and decide
whether the defendant really desired to be tried promptly.112 In State v.
Rachie,113 the district court found that the defendant made a clear demand for a speedy trial, but the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed
because the demand was not on the record.114 In State v. Washington,115
the North Carolina Court of Appeals considered a defendant’s demands
for forensic evidence testing as evidence of informally asserting his right

108. See United States v. Frye, 489 F.3d 201, 211 (5th Cir. 2007) (“An assertion
of that right is a demand for a speedy trial, which will generally be an
objection to a continuance or a motion asking to go to trial.”); see also Laws
v. Stephens, 536 F. App’x 409, 413 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding defendant
“insufficiently and inconsistently asserted his speedy-trial rights” as “[h]e
concurrently signed an ‘Agreed Setting’ form and took other actions
suggesting that he was not, in fact, ready for trial” (citing Millard v. Lynaugh,
810 F.2d 1403, 1406 (5th Cir. 1987))); United States v. Villalobos, 560 F.
App’x 122, 127 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting that although the defendant raised the
issue of his right to a speedy trial both through motions and in court,
“‘[r]epeated assertions of the right do not, however, balance this factor in favor
of a petitioner when other actions indicate that he is unwilling or unready to
go to trial’” (quoting Hakeem v. Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 764 (3d Cir. 1993))).
109. See Prince v. Alabama, 507 F.2d 693, 703 (5th Cir. 1975) (“We interpret
these rulings as an indication that the courts should take a liberal view of
convict-defendants’ attempts to contact the prosecutors and courts in other
jurisdictions regarding charges pending against them there.”).
110. Herman, supra note 24, at 228.
111. Douglas v. Cathel, 456 F.3d 403, 418 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[H]is well-documented
efforts to secure counsel are properly viewed as part and parcel of his efforts
to assert his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.”).
112. See United States v. Litton Sys., Inc., 722 F.2d 264, 271 (5th Cir. 1984)
(rejecting the notion that a letter from defense counsel dissolving an
agreement to suspend further action in criminal case proceedings during
settlement negotiations asserted defendant's right to a speedy trial).
113. 427 N.W.2d 253 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
114. Id. at 257.
115. 665 S.E.2d 799 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
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to a speedy trial.116 Because the defendant’s complaints about testing
were coupled with a subsequent formal request for speedy trial, the
court weighed the assertion factor in the defendant’s favor.117 However,
the same court distinguished Washington in State v. Williams118 by
holding that a motion for discovery does not evidence assertion of the
right to a speedy trial when the state does not delay the trial to collect
evidence.119
In Adams v. State,120 the Supreme Court of Mississippi acknowledged that the defendant’s counsel expressed that the defendant’s
speedy trial right may have been violated, but nonetheless decided, “if
anything, [the defendant] asserted a right to an instant trial.”121 The
Adams court seemed to differentiate between moving for a speedy trial
and moving to dismiss for lack of a speedy trial.122 Further, courts consider the timing and form of a defendant’s request for speedy trial.123
For example, in United States v. Henson,124 the First Circuit held that
a letter sent to the district court prior to any formal charges being filed
against the defendant was not sufficient to be considered evidence of
asserting the right to a speedy trial.125 In State v. O’Brien,126 the Ohio
Supreme Court held that the defendant, who waived his right to a
speedy trial under state law, was not entitled to Sixth Amendment
speedy trial relief because he did not make formal written objections to
the prosecution’s continuances.127
116. Id. at 808.
117. Id.
118. 207 N.C. App. 266 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010).
119. Id. at *5 (“[W]hen there is no indication that the State delayed the trial in
order to collect discoverable material, we will not interpret a defendant’s
motion for discovery as an assertion of his right to a speedy trial.”).
120. 583 So. 2d 165 (Miss. 1991).
121. Id. at 169.
122. Id.
123. See United States v. Henson, 945 F.2d 430, 438 (1st Cir. 1991) (noting that a
defendant did not assert his Sixth Amendment rights when, prior to any
charges being filed against him, he submitted a letter to the court requesting
a speedy disposition); see also State v. O’Brien, 516 N.E.2d 218, 221 (Ohio
1987) (holding that after a defendant agrees in writing to waive his rights to
a speedy trial, he will not be entitled to a dismissal for a speedy trial unless
he “files a formal written objection to any further continuances and makes a
demand for trial . . . .”).
124. 945 F.2d 430 (1st Cir. 1991).
125. Id. at 438–39.
126. 516 N.E.2d 218 (Ohio 1987).
127. Id. at 221.
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In addition, courts are willing to acknowledge unorthodox assertions of speedy trial rights, but have a high threshold for deciding to
weigh the factor in favor of the defendant.128 For instance, a court may
acknowledge a motion to dismiss as demonstrating a defendant’s desire
for a speedy trial but will not weigh the assertion factor in the defendant’s favor if the motion is not sufficiently vigorous.129 The Texas
Court of Appeals even held, “[a] request for a dismissal instead of a
speedy trial weakens his claim because it shows a desire to have no trial
instead of a speedy trial.”130 The Sixth Circuit has considered bail requests as evidence of defendants asserting the right to a speedy trial.131
Yet, the court only weighed the assertion factor in the defendant’s favor
because the bail requests were coupled with a series of forceful demands.132 In sum, courts have a large degree of discretion in deciding
what constitutes an assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and even
more discretion in deciding how to weigh the assertion factor when
applying the Barker test.
D.

Weighing the Assertion Factor

When applying the Barker test, courts consider the evidence for
each factor independently and decide which factors weigh in favor, or
against the defendant.133 Generally, the standard of review for a speedy

128. Cf. Henson, 945 F.3d 430 at 438–39 (holding that a letter sent before federal
charges had been lodged against a defendant did not carry enough weight
to find assertion).
129. See Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Pemberton, 813 F.2d 626, 628–29 (3d Cir. 1987)
(finding that the defendant’s motion to dismiss did not relieve him of his duty
“to make a reasonable assertion of his speedy trial right”). See also Phillips
v. State, 650 S.W.2d 396, 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (citation omitted)
(“Although a motion to dismiss notifies the State and the court of the speedy
trial claim, a defendant’s motivation in asking for dismissal rather than a
prompt trial is clearly relevant, and may sometimes attenuate the strength of
his claim.”).
130. Parkerson v. State, 942 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex. App. 1997) (citations
omitted). See also United States v. Frye, 489 F.3d 201, 212 (5th Cir. 2007)
(citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 534–35 (1972)) (“A motion for
dismissal is not evidence that the defendant wants to be tried promptly.”).
131. See Cain v. Smith, 686 F.2d 374, 384 (6th Cir. 1982) (“We hold that a
demand for reasonable bail is the functional equivalent of a demand for a
speedy trial.”).
132. Id. at 384 (“Cain forcefully raised the speedy trial right on at least five
different occasions.”).
133. See Glover v. State, 792 A.2d 1160, 1167 (Md. 2002) (“[O]ur independent
constitutional appraisal of the petitioner’s speedy trial claims begins most
effectively with a factor-by-factor approach.”).
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trial right violation turns on whether three Barker factors “weigh heavily in the defendant’s favor.”134 However, the Barker opinion’s emphasis
on ad hoc considerations gives courts full discretion to decide which
factors support the defendants and how much weight to give to each
individual factor.135 Further, the Fifth Circuit has stated that, “[m]ere
assertion of the speedy trial right is not enough for this factor to weigh
in a defendant’s favor.”136 Depending on the circumstances, a court may
find that the defendant needed to make continuous demands for trial
starting immediately after arrest, or that a single demand made at a
reasonable time was sufficient.137 This wide range of discretion effectively gives defendants no guidance on whether their demands will be
sufficient for the court and impedes criminal defense strategy.138
When deciding whether to weigh the assertion factor in the defendant’s favor, courts often examine the vigor and timeliness of the defendant’s assertion.139 However, courts’ liberal analysis of the timeliness
and vigor of a defendant’s speedy trial demands can make the assertion
factor so malleable that it becomes meaningless.140 For example, in
Glover v. State,141 the Maryland Court of Special Appeals found that
although the defendant demanded a speedy trial two months after his
indictment and then again one year later, the defendant’s failure to
demand a speedy trial following an additional postponement of his case
demonstrated an insufficient assertion of his right to a speedy trial, so

134. United States v. Rojas, 812 F.3d 382, 410 (5th Cir. 2016) (“The court can
presume prejudice if the first three factors weigh heavily in the defendant’s
favor; if they do not, the defendant must show actual prejudice.”).
135. Herman, supra note 24, at 222.
136. United States v. Parker, 505 F.3d 323, 329 (5th Cir. 2007).
137. See Johnson v. State, 975 S.W.2d 644, 651 (Tex. App. 1998) (explaining that
the assertion factor would have weighed more heavily in defendant’s favor
had she persistently demanded her right to a speedy trial). See also Williams
v. State, 610 S.E.2d 32, 34 (Ga. 2005) (noting that the defendant’s demand
for a speedy trial made six months after indictment would have weighed in
his favor if not for subsequent action by defendant’s counsel).
138. Herman, supra note 24, at 223. See Christopher S. Elmore, Glover v. State:
A Misinterpretation and Misapplication of the Barker Speedy Trial
Balancing Test Results in the Weakening of a Criminal Defendant’s Right
to a Prompt Trial, 62 Md. L. Rev. 573 (2003) (discussing how the
Maryland courts misapplied the Barker test).
139. See Glover v. State, 792 A.2d 1160, 1170 (Md. 2002).
140. See id. (deciding that the assertion factor did not weigh in favor of the
defendant despite multiple attempts to demand a speedy trial).
141. 792 A.2d 1160 (Md. 2002).
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that the assertion factor did not weigh in his favor.142 The court reasoned that Glover should have objected to the pre-trial delays sooner.143
Although the Maryland Court of Appeals disagreed with the weight the
lower court placed on the factor,144 the court nevertheless affirmed the
decision because the delay did not “unduly prejudice[] the defendant.”145
In some cases, courts have bifurcated vigorousness and timeliness
when analyzing the defendant’s assertion of the right to a speedy trial.146
For example, in Johnson v. State the court held that although the
defendant made a timely request for a speedy trial, the assertion factor
did not weigh heavily in the defendant’s favor because the defendant’s
demand was not sufficiently vigorous.147 The Johnson Court based its
decision on the fact that the defendant did not make subsequent persistent demands for trial after her initial timely request.148
Further, some courts have refused to weigh the assertion factor in
favor of the defendant—despite the defendant expressing a clear demand for trial—because of technicalities.149 For example, in State v.
Spivey,150 the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the defendant
made a prompt assertion of his right to a speedy trial, but the assertion
factor did not weigh in his favor because the defendant acted pro se
despite having competent legal representation.151

142. Id. at 1170.
143. Id.
144. See id. (“While we agree that, upon learning that the third postponement
resulted in a six-month delay . . . the petitioner could have, and probably
should have, immediately asserted his right to a speedy trial, we must
disagree with the excessive weight the Court of Special Appeals places on
this facet of the case.”).
145. Id. at 1172.
146. See Zamorano v. State, 84 S.W.3d 643, 651–52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)
(footnotes omitted) (“This late assertion, had no subsequent motion been
filed, might well have undercut his Sixth Amendment claim. But appellant’s
second attempt to seek a speedy trial, which came less than two months
after the trial court denied his initial motion, evidenced his persistence. This
is not a case where appellant never asked for a hearing.”).
147. See Johnson v. State, 975 S.W.2d 644, 651 (Tex. App. 1998) (citation
omitted) (“The failure to invoke the right earlier does not amount to waiver,
but because Appellant did not persistently assert her right to a speedy trial,
we did not weigh this factor heavily in her favor.”).
148. Id.
149. See State v. Spivey, 579 S.E.2d 251, 256 (N.C. 2003) (noting, first, that the
defendant’s assertion through pro se was improper, but even so, “the
assertion of the right, by itself, did not entitle him to relief”).
150. 579 S.E.2d 251 (N.C. 2003).
151. Id. at 256.
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In addition, courts often tie the nature of defendants’ speedy trial
demands in with other factors in the Barker test.152 For example, courts
have considered a defendant’s failure to make an early demand for
speedy trial as demonstrating lack of prejudice faced by the defendant.153 A court may reason that a defendant who does not make an
early demand for speedy trial relief is not really seeking a speedy trial.154
This type of reasoning is problematic not only because it results in
courts erroneously finding that defendants acquiesced to delays, but
also because it makes the assertion factor superfluous.
Authors have written about many societal interests in providing
defendants with speedy trials beyond those considered in the Barker
balancing test.155 Although concepts such as governmental needs and
victims’ relief provide good rationales for creating policy, the
Constitution does not confer a duty on the court to consider these concerns.156 Furthermore, it is important to reflect on tradition and history.
Courts have always weighed governmental, societal, and defendants’
interests when considering the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to
a speedy trial.157 Keeping these concerns in mind, this Note analyzes
how courts should determine whether to grant criminal defendants relief
for speedy trial right violations, and attempts to provide a modified
test that allows for necessary considerations, yet stays true to the intent
of the Sixth Amendment.

III. Problems Created by the Assertion Factor
By including the assertion factor in the Barker test, the Supreme
Court intended to preserve the defendant’s obligation to make some

152. See Ex parte Anderson, 979 So. 2d 777, 781 (Ala. 2007) (citation omitted).
153. Id.
154. State v. Rachie, 427 N.W.2d 253, 257 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
155. See Herman, supra note 24, at 208 (“The Court has settled on the idea
that the Sixth Amendment right serves three purposes for defendants—
preventing undue restraint on liberty, undue anxiety and disruption of one’s
life because of pending charges, and undue impairment of the ability to
defend against the charges . . . .”); see also Mary Beth Ricke, Note, Victims’
Right to a Speedy Trial: Shortcomings, Improvements, and Alternatives to
Legislative Protection, 41 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 181, 184 (2013) (arguing
that speedy trial helps victims get relief from timely convictions); Tobias
Weiss, The Federal Speedy Trial: Speedy Injustice?, 56 Conn. B.J. 245,
246–47 (1982) (arguing that the Speedy Trial Act benefits the government
by catching unprepared defendants off-guard).
156. See U.S. Const. amend. VI (stating broad rights of the accused in a
criminal trial).
157. See supra Part I.A. (discussing the history of speedy trial jurisprudence).
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kind of demand for a speedy trial.158 Despite the Court’s good intentions, the factor created several problems in speedy trial jurisprudence.
Courts’ general resistance to dismissing cases and inconsistent opinions
in the lower courts places an unfair burden on defendants who suffer
lengthy pre-trial delays. In addition, courts may find improper demands
to be dispositive in cases and effectively apply the demand-waiver rule.
Further, the assertion factor has allowed courts to deny speedy trial
violations in the vast majority of cases, and thus not enforce the
guaranteed protections intended by the Constitution.
A.

Unfair Burden on Criminal Defendants

The flexibility of the Barker test leaves defendants at the mercy of
a court’s discretion. A court can find that a defendant made a timely
demand for a speedy trial, was prejudiced by the delay, did not personally cause the delay, but deny dismissal because the defendant did not
sufficiently and vigorously assert his right.159 Courts essentially have
the power to determine whether a defendant actually wanted a speedy
trial, and decide that to be dispositive. There is no limit to what a court
can consider sufficiently vigorous or timely, and defendants’ failures to
make timely and vigorous demands are not always due to acquiescence
to the delay.160 For example, an insolvent defendant may be represented
by an overworked public defender who does not have time to pay close
attention to the case, and consequently does not make vigorous assertions for her client’s right to a speedy trial.161 Thus, through no fault of
the defendant, the court may deny that there has been a speedy trial
violation because of the apparent failure by the defendant to properly
assert his right to a speedy trial.
For example, consider the case of Jerry Hartfield.162 The court denied Hartfield his constitutional right to a speedy trial just because he

158. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 528 (1972).
159. Herman, supra note 24, at 222. See Ex parte Hartfield, 442 S.W.3d 805, 811
n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (describing how the trial court weighed the
Barker factors).
160. See Ford, supra note 17.
161. See David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1229, 1281 (2002) (“Public defender offices are
chronically understaffed and cannot pay enough to retain experienced
attorneys. Lawyers appointed from private practice are paid far below
market rates and often face unrealistically low fee caps. Consequently, poor
defendants represented under either system often receive substandard
representation: Attorneys lack the time and resources to mount the kind of
defense any informed, paying client would expect.”).
162. See supra notes 1–17 and accompanying text (describing the facts of Jerry
Hartfield’s criminal prosecution and petition for writ of habeas corpus).
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failed to demand it during his twenty-three years of incarceration.163
The court was well aware of Hartfield’s mental incompetency and lack
of legal representation during his prison sentence, yet the court still
weighed the assertion factor heavily against Hartfield.164 This brings to
light a glaring flaw with the current state of speedy trial jurisprudence.
Courts are disregarding the hardships faced by defendants navigating a
complex criminal justice system, with harsh consequences. Courts
require defendants to make appropriately timed and sufficiently clear
invocations of the right to a speedy trial, despite inconsistent and unclear standards for what courts consider to be proper demands.165
Besides, courts do not seem to care whether defendants are aware of
the duty, or capable of properly asserting the right to a speedy trial.
Why should defendants bear the burden of properly asking the state
for a constitutional right? How can the court decide whether a defendant really wants a speedy trial? Is a defendant’s demand for a speedy
trial not sufficient in itself? One explanation for courts’ variable applications of the assertion factor is reluctance to dismiss charges.166
Because the United States Supreme Court has set minimal guidelines
for applying the Barker factors, courts are free to use the assertion
factor as an excuse for denying dismissal.167 Often, the facts of a case
dictate that certain Barker factors clearly weigh in favor of or against
a defendant.168 Therefore, courts rely on the malleability of the assertion
factor to decide against defendants in close cases.
For instance, a defendant may have suffered a sufficiently lengthy
delay from arrest to trial, been prejudiced by the delay, and found case
law showing these factors must be weighed in the defendant’s favor.
However, the reason for the delay may be something that the court
considers neutral. If the court applies a general rule of dismissal when
three of the four Barker factors weigh in favor of the defendant, then
the assertion factor becomes very important. A court that is convinced
of a defendant’s guilt, or is generally hesitant to dismiss a case, will try
to find a way to weigh the assertion factor against the defendant. Since
the standard for what constitutes a sufficient demand for a speedy trial

163. Ex parte Hartfield, 442 S.W.3d 805, 813, 817 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
164. Id. at 811 n.5.
165. See supra Part II.C–D (discussing how courts apply the Barker test’s
assertion factor and how to consider assertions when weighing the Barker
factors).
166. See Herman, supra note 24, at 222 (noting that a hesitation to dismiss is
possibly implicit in language of Barker, Macdonald, and Loud Hawk).
167. See supra Part II (discussing the application of the Barker test).
168. See supra Part II.D (discussing how courts weigh the Barker factors).
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is unclear, courts are free to weigh the assertion factor based on whatever criteria they see fit.169
For example, in Boseman v. State,170 the Georgia Supreme Court
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss for a speedy trial right violation despite the defendant waiting for trial in custody for twentyseven months.171 The court found that the delay was sufficiently long,
and the reason for the delay should weigh in the defendant’s favor.172
Also, the court “assume[d] that the 27 month delay, standing alone,
was oppressive.”173 However, with relatively no discussion, the court did
not weigh the assertion factor in favor of the defendant because he
waited twenty-seven months to file a motion to dismiss.174 Despite the
lengthy delay and presumed prejudice, the court denied the defendant’s
motion to dismiss because there was “no impairment to his defense.”175
This type of reasoning contradicts the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in Barker and Klopfer.176 In Barker and Klopfer, the Court stressed
the importance of considering the inherent harms defendants suffer because they are awaiting trial.177 Respecting the essential holdings of
those decisions, courts should work to guarantee the right to a speedy
trial in order to eliminate the serious harms that pre-trial delays cause
criminal defendants. Apparently, this is not the case.178 Ambiguous
standards for what constitutes a sufficiently vigorous or timely assertion—and the omnipresent argument of defendants acquiescing to delays—make the assertion factor an excuse for courts to unjustly refuse
to dismiss cases. Courts’ efforts to avoid dismissal place an unfair burden on criminal defendants. The Supreme Court seems to support this
pervasive injustice because of its unwillingness to clarify the Barker
test.179

169. Id.
170. 438 S.E.2d 626 (Ga. 1994).
171. Id. at 629.
172. Id. at 628–29.
173. Id. at 629.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532–33 (1972); Klopfer v. State, 386 U.S.
213, 222 (1967).
177. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532–33; Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 222.
178. See Herman, supra note 24, at 220 (explaining how courts generally never
dismiss cases for speedy trial right violations).
179. See id. at 207–12 (explaining that there has not been a Supreme Court case
addressing speedy trial issues since Barker).
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B.

Courts Applying the “Demand-Waiver” Rule

At first blush, the Barker court’s rejection of the rigid “demandwaiver rule” and call for the weighing of the assertion factor seemed to
allow courts additional means for granting defendants relief in speedy
trial cases.180 However, Justice Powell’s emphasis on considering the
frequency and force of speedy trial assertions effectively gave courts
enough latitude to find the factor to be either determinative or inconsequential.181 Courts consider a defendant’s failure to make timely or
frequent demands as demonstrating acquiescence to the delay and find
that the delay was reasonable.182 This reasoning is problematic because
it overlooks inherent harms defendants suffer while awaiting trial and
ignores situations where a defendant may fail to invoke the right to a
speedy trial due to ignorance or factors beyond the defendant’s
control.183
In light of the Barker opinion’s emphasis on considering the frequency and force of demands, courts are free to determine whether the
effort a defendant makes to demand a speedy trial should be given
heavy consideration.184 This creates situations where the nature of defendants’ speedy trial demands may be dispositive in cases where defendants are not actually acquiescing to delays.185 Therefore, the court may
functionally return to the “demand-waiver rule” by treating a defendant’s inability to demand a speedy trial as essentially waiving the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right.186 In fact, courts have done this.187
In State v. Spivey, the North Carolina Supreme Court found that a
four-and-half year delay was sufficiently long to weigh in favor of the
defendant, and since a congested docket caused the delay, the second

180. Barker, 407 U.S. at 528–30.
181. Herman, supra note 24, at 227.
182. See Ex parte Anderson, 979 So. 2d 777, 781 (Ala. 2007) (holding that a
defendant’s lack of demand demonstrated a lack of prejudice to the
defendant).
183. See supra Part II.B (quoting Justice Powell describing the harms defendants
suffer while awaiting trial); Part II.D (discussing how courts weight the
assertion factor against defendants who do not make technically sound
demands for speedy trial).
184. Barker, 407 U.S. at 529.
185. See supra Part II (discussing harms to defendants waiting a long period for
trial).
186. See Darren Allen, Note, The Constitutional Floor Doctrine and the Right to
a Speedy Trial, 26 Campbell L. Rev. 101, 112 (2004) (suggesting that some
courts have applied pre-Barker precedent and turned the assertion factor
into what could resemble the demand-waiver rule).
187. State v. Spivey, 579 S.E.2d 251, 256 (N.C. 2003).
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Barker factor was neutral—but slightly in favor of the defendant.188 The
court reasoned that the delay was long enough to be presumptively
prejudicial, and that the defendant suffered some prejudice from the
unavailability of a witness.189 However, the court found that the assertion prong of the Barker test weighed against the defendant, despite the
fact that the defendant made a pro se motion for dismissal one year
after his arrest and defendant’s counsel again moved to dismiss less
than two years later.190 The court reasoned that the defendant did not
have the right to be represented by counsel and appear pro se, so the
initial motion to dismiss would not weigh in the defendant’s favor.191
Therefore, the court held the defendant did not make a sufficiently
timely or vigorous assertion and the defendant’s constitutional right to
a speedy trial was not violated.192 Spivey essentially waived his right to
a speedy trial by electing to file his initial motion pro se instead of
through his attorney.
Allowing courts to apply discretion to that effect was undoubtedly
not Justice Powell’s intention in writing the Barker opinion, nor what
the constitutional framers had in mind when they enacted the Sixth
Amendment. The framers thought that trial delays were problematic
enough to merit the codifying a right to a speedy trial and the Court
has held this right to be fundamental. Upholding this fundamental and
important right should not be left to the whims of lower court judges.
C.

Distortion of the Right to a Speedy Trial

In addition to causing unjust results in cases where defendants’
speedy trial rights are violated, the assertion factor of the Barker test
impacts the nature of the right to a speedy trial itself. In Barker, Justice
Powell noted, “speedy trial is unique.”193 Powell further established that
his speedy trial right analysis was meant to “comport[] with constitutional principles.”194 This conflicting ideology in the Barker opinion has
created inconsistency in speedy trial jurisprudence and distorted the
meaning of the right to a speedy trial.195 There is nothing in the
188. Id. at 255.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 256.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 257. The state made arguments along similar lines in Hartfield,
claiming that the Hartfield’s pro se requests for relief were not assertions.
See Brief of Appellee at 53, Ex parte Hartfield, 442 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2014) (No. 13-14-00240-CR) (arguing that the defendant’s failure to
assert the right to a speedy trial comes close to barring relief).
193. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529 (1972).
194. Id.
195. Herman, supra note 24, at 222.
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Constitution that signals the need to treat the right to a speedy trial
different from other constitutional rights.196 Yet, courts treat the right
to a speedy trial idiosyncratically.197 For instance, courts distinguish the
Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial from the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.198 Courts have interpreted the right to counsel clause
as guaranteeing indigent defendants legal representation in criminal
cases, unless a defendant affirmatively waives the right.199 Conversely,
courts require defendants to demand their right in order to obtain the
benefit of a speedy trial, and making demands does not guarantee that
defendants will receive that benefit.200
The dissonance between the language in the Sixth Amendment and
courts’ application of the right is problematic because it distorts the
values embedded in the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights was meant to
protect the population from oppression by ensuring certain rights.
When courts create conditions on those rights, the guarantee of protection is lost. David Sklansky has argued that the court has treated
the Constitution’s criminal procedure rights not as “negative rights,”
but as “quasi-affirmative rights.”201 According to Sklansky, quasi-affirmative rights are “affirmative constitutional conditions on actions that,
realistically, the government cannot entirely forego.”202 This means that
some constitutional rights, like the right to a speedy trial, require the
government to take some kind of action, but only if conditions require
the action.203 These rights are different from “negative rights” that prevent the government from taking action, such as the Fourth
Amendment’s protection from unreasonable searches and seizures.204
Courts’ application of the Barker test’s assertion factor fosters the
speedy trial right’s quasi-affirmative nature. Courts grant the right to
a speedy trial conditionally, depending on how and when defendants
ask for the right. Further, the flexibility of the Barker test allows courts
to create nearly impossible conditions for defendants to prove speedytrial-right violations, which begs the question of whether the Sixth

196. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
197. Herman, supra note 24, at 210–11.
198. Id. at 211.
199. Id. at 150.
200. See supra Part II.D (discussing how defendants must make “timely” and
“vigorous” demands for speedy trial).
201. Sklansky, supra note 161, at 1230.
202. Id. at 1234.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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Amendment actually guarantees the accused the right to a speedy
trial.205
Sklansky suggests that the reason that courts have developed quasiaffirmative rights is hesitation to create demand for systematic
reform.206 Imposing affirmative obligations on the government would
place additional burden on governmental entities trying to perform
those obligations and create demand from citizens that the government
perform those obligations in an effective and efficient manner. On the
other hand, establishing that a right is quasi-affirmative allows the
courts to set parameters that define the right. These parameters create
conditions on when courts may grant constitutional rights—like the
right to a speedy trial—which allow the courts more room to deny that
violations occurred.207 However, narrowing parameters and increasing
freedom to deny violations comes with the cost of diminishing the protections contained in the Constitution. In the case of speedy trial rights,
courts’ affirmative restraints have gone too far and placed an unconstitutional and unjust burden on criminal defendants.

IV. Improving the Test
Scholars agree that the Barker test needs be re-calibrated.208 Justice
Powell’s vague and unforceful language in the Barker opinion did not
yield its intended results.209 Since Barker, courts have dismissed an extremely low number of cases for speedy trial right violations,210 and
numerous authors have expressed concerns over state courts applying
the Barker test with unjust results.211 Yet, flexibility is necessary to
205. See supra Part II (discussing what courts consider proper assertions and how
they weigh the assertion factor).
206. See Sklansky, supra note 161, at 1286 (“It is not that judges refuse to impose
affirmative obligations on the government, but rather that they decline to
meddle in the overall operation of the criminal justice system.”).
207. See generally id. (discussing conditional rights and courts’ unwillingness to
grant rights that are quasi-affirmative).
208. See Herman, supra note 24, at 208 (“[A]s Professor Uviller suggested, a
court truly interested in deterring or punishing prosecutorial bad faith would
recalibrate the factors in Barker v. Wingo.”); see also Uviller, supra note 61,
at 1382–89 (critiquing the Barker test).
209. See Uviller, supra note 61, at 1389–99 (analyzing the Barker test).
210. Herman, supra note 24, at 231.
211. See Lewis LeNaire, Comment, Vermont v. Brillon: Public Defense and the
Sixth Amendment Right to a Speedy Trial, 35 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 219,
219 (2010) (discussing whether the actions of a public defender causing a
delay in trial should weigh against the government, or against the defendant
being represented); see also Kaitlyn Roach, Note, The Sixth Amendment
Right to a Speedy Trial: Sentenced to the Mississippi Gallows: Johnson v.
State, 32 Miss. C. L. Rev. 205, 224–28 (2013) (discussing how Mississippi
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account for the nuances in criminal prosecution.212 Therefore, an effective and palatable means of curing the problems created by the Barker
test would be for courts to reinterpret the test by eliminating the assertion factor and applying the remaining three factors: (1) the length of
the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, and (3) prejudice to the defendant.213
Under the current Barker test, the assertion factor is superfluous.
Applying a three-factor test, courts would not lose any ability to make
effective decisions on speedy trial right violations because of the flexibility allowed by the other three factors.214 Courts could easily analyze
defendants’ lack of effort to demand speedy trial rights as a reason for
the delay, or as showing a lack of prejudice to the defendant. In fact,
courts have done this on occasion.215 Therefore, the proposed test would
not cause much disruption in speedy trial decisions, while creating
positive change.
The proposed test would positively impact the criminal justice
system in three ways. First, the three-factor test would increase dismissal rates and put pressure on the government to implement systematic changes that would improve the criminal justice system. Second, a
three-factor test would create more consistency in speedy trial jurisprudence and effectively put an end to the “demand-waiver rule.”
Finally, the proposed test would remove the burden of requiring defendants to demand the constitutional right to a speedy trial and restore
the intended meaning of the language in the Sixth Amendment.

courts have not granted speedy trial rights and have misapplied the law);
Allen, supra note 186, at 112–13 (contending that the court applied the
Barker test to effectively return to the “demand-waiver rule”).
212. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529–30 (1972) (explaining the
importance of an ad hoc balancing test).
213. See infra Part IV.B.
214. In an article written shortly after the Barker decision, Professor Uviller
makes a similar argument. See Uviller, supra note 61, at 1391 (“In the
absence of a waiver, evinced in the customary way, the Court should have
moved to a consideration of the other factors.”).
215. See Ex parte Anderson, 979 So. 2d 777, 783 (Ala. 2007) (“Anderson’s own
conduct in waiting 22 of those 25 months before first asserting his right to a
speedy trial, and then seeking a continuance, suggests, absent some contrary
explanation, that Anderson did not consider the delay to be prejudicial.”);
see also Lewis v. State, 469 So. 2d 1291, 1294 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (“The
fact that Blake did not assert his right to a speedy trial prior to November
1982, tends to suggest that he either acquiesced in the delays or suffered only
minimal prejudice prior to that date.”).
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A.

Improving the Criminal Justice System

In Barker, Justice Powell noted how governmental negligence and
overcrowded dockets should be considered in speedy trial cases.216 However, Justice Powell considered that these are more “neutral reason[s]”
for delays and should be given less weight than delays intentionally
caused by the parties.217 Despite the tepidness in this part of the Barker
opinion, courts have considered overcrowded dockets and scheduling
problems as being attributable to government negligence, thus weighing
in favor of defendants.218 The fact that judges can take control and
“order a case assigned for trial”219 adds further support for defendants’
speedy trial claims because it weakens the position that delays were
outside of government control.
Since governmental negligence is a common cause of pre-trial delays, courts often fall back on the assertion factor in order to deny
dismissal. For example, in Adams v. State,220 the Mississippi Supreme
Court refused to weigh the Barker factors in favor of the defendant.221
The court acknowledged that the delay was caused by governmental
negligence, and that the defendant’s counsel denied acquiescing to the
delays.222 However, the court denied dismissal because a scheduling conflict with the defendant’s counsel contributed to the delay and the defendant did not properly assert his speedy trial right.223 Under the proposed three-part test, the Adams Court would have difficulty refusing
dismissal. Conceding that the length of delay was sufficient and that
the defendant was prejudiced, the court would only have the “reason
for delay” factor to weigh against the defendant. The Adams Court
would be forced to take a harder look at the governmental negligence
that caused the delay. In order to deny dismissal, the court would need
to rely on the fact that the defendant contributed to the delay, although
the effect was minor.224 Therefore, the court would have little grounds
to deny dismissal and the decision would be vulnerable on appeal.
Further, under the proposed test, courts would no longer be able to
claim that defendants are not prejudiced by delays because they failed

216. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
217. Id.
218. Epps v. State, 345 A.2d 62, 74 (Md. 1975).
219. Id.
220. 583 So. 2d 165 (Miss. 1991).
221. Id. at 170.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 169–70.
224. Id. at 170.
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to make sufficiently vigorous and timely demands for speedy trial. 225
Since there is strong policy against dismissals, the government would
have to resort to other means to avoid speedy trial violations. The desire to avoid dismissals would create an incentive for the government
to mitigate pre-trial delays by making the criminal justice system more
efficient. An analogy can be drawn to justifications for the exclusionary
rule for evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.226
Evidence obtained from an unconstitutional search and seizure is excluded from the record in order to deter undesired police practices.227
The rationale is that if fewer criminals are convicted when police violate
the Fourth Amendment, then police will stop unconstitutional practices.228 In fact, the exclusionary rule has been shown to be effective in
creating more professional police practices.229 Although courts have
moved towards only applying the exclusionary rule in cases of egregious
violations, courts could apply a similar remedy to Sixth Amendment
speedy-trial-right violations. 230 If courts dismiss more speedy trial cases,
then prosecutors will have an incentive to end the behaviors and policies
that cause egregious delays.231 There is a concern of misplacing the incentive because prosecution is not always responsible for delays.
However, judges could address that concern by appropriately weighing
the “reason for the delay” factor when deciding cases. Additionally,
there is no way of knowing how effective an increased dismissal rate
would be in creating real systematic changes. Ideally, the government
would be forced take a hard look at the criminal justice system and find
ways to make lasting improvements.
Problematically, however, systematic reform would require a great
deal of work and expense. With so many moving parts involved in the
criminal justice system, policy makers would need to conduct a great
225. See State v. Fischer, 744 N.W.2d 760, 770 (N.D. 2008) (holding that because
defendant did not assert his speedy trial right until a year after his arrest,
the defendant was not prejudiced by the delay).
226. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (discussing the importance of
the exclusionary rule).
227. Id. at 656.
228. Id.
229. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598 (2006) (“Another development
over the past half-century that deters civil-rights violations is the increasing
professionalism of police forces, including a new emphasis on internal police
discipline.”).
230. See id. at 591 (“Suppression of evidence, however, has always been our last
resort, not our first impulse.”).
231. See Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 45 (1970) (“[S]o far as society’s interest in
the effective prosecution of criminal cases is concerned, delay on the
government’s part need not impair its ability to prove the defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
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deal of analysis before making any adjustments. Before deciding what
changes to make, the government would need to determine what needs
to be fixed, what can be fixed, and the costs associated with implementing the solutions.232 Given a limited budget, prosecutors could
consider a cost-benefit analysis in order to decide what changes to
make.233 The government would have to consider the associated costs
and benefits of pretrial delays, and how to weigh them against one
another.234 Even if the legislators can create a good policy plan, the
government still faces political pressure and public backlash. Courts
undoubtedly feel uncomfortable imposing these hardships on the
government.235
Further, courts may feel that it is the job of the legislature to initiate systematic changes because the legislature controls the funding
that fuels the criminal justice system.236 The legislature sets a budget
that determines the number of prosecutors, police officers, and judges.237
If the legislature is pressured by the courts to grant or deny funding,
then effectively the courts have influenced policy. Also, judges have
incentives to avoid putting pressure on the legislature because the legislature determines the judges’ salaries.238 Presumably, spending public
money to benefit criminal defendants awaiting trial would not be pop-

232. See John Roman, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Criminal Justice Reforms, Nat’l
Inst. Of Justice (Sep. 11, 2016), https://www.nij.gov/journals/272/pages/
cost-benefit.aspx [https://perma.cc/2U3T-5UTS] (discussing the complications involved with cost-benefit analysis of criminal justice reform).
233. See id. (explaining that cost-benefit analyses in criminology compare the
costs and benefits of proposed programs with the costs and benefits of current
programs and that policymakers could use these comparisons to determine
whether new approaches will be beneficial from a budgetary perspective).
234. An example of a systemic problem is underfunded public defender programs.
Many states have a large backlog of cases because there are insufficient funds
to support enough public defenders to efficiently resolve cases. See Debbie
Elliot, Need A Public Defender In New Orleans? Get In Line, NPR (Feb.
4, 2016, 4:59 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/02/04/465452920/in-neworleans-court-appointed-lawyers-turning-away-suspects [https://perma.cc/
J4RR-TASC] (explaining the problems caused by underfunded public
defender programs).
235. See Sklansky, supra note 161, at 1284 (“The general aversion courts feel
toward affirmative rights may be especially pronounced in this context
because courts would not just be ordering states to do things that cost
money, but would be directly compelling expenditures.”).
236. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure
and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L.J. 1, 7 (1997).
237. Id.
238. See 28 U.S.C. § 5 (2012) (explaining that judges’ salaries are determined by
statute).
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ular. However, a more efficient system could foster many societal benefits. For instance, a more efficient criminal justice system would mitigate the costs of detaining defendants awaiting trial.239 Defendants
moving swiftly through the criminal justice system would allow jails to
free up space and potentially save local communities large amounts of
money.240 Moreover, although systemic changes may be costly, budget
concerns should not be favored over the protection of constitutional
rights. The government needs to be accountable for its actions and
abide by constitutional principles.
B.

Eliminating the “Demand-Waiver Rule” and
Increasing Consistency in Opinions

A three-factor test would more effectively fulfill the Barker Court’s
intention of eliminating the “demand-waiver rule.”241 Under the threefactor test, courts would have a difficult time denying relief to defendants who suffer long pre-trial delays, but do not make demands for a
speedy trial. Courts would still be free to consider defendants’ failures
to demand in conjunction with the other factors, but they would lose
the ability to make a supposedly failed assertion dispositive. In order
to deny dismissal, a court would have to show that a defendant’s lack
of effort to demand a speedy trial was part of the reason for the delay,
or demonstrated a lack of prejudice to the defendant. Similarly, prosecutors would have to show that a defendant benefited from failing to
assert the right to a speedy trial. Placing this burden on the prosecution
would eliminate the presumption that defendants waived the constitutional right by not making a proper assertion. This argument is supported by Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Dickey v. Florida.242 In his concurrence, Brennan discusses how the Court has moved toward a presumption against waiver.243 Brennan then reasons that the right to
speedy trial is decidedly fundamental, and asks the question, “can it be
239. Cf. Christian Henrichson, Joshua Rinaldi & Ruth Delaney, The Price of Jails:
Measuring the Taxpayer Cost of Local Incarceration, Vera Inst. of Justice
24 (May 2015) (describing the enormous community costs of local
incarceration).
240. See id. (“The only way localities can safely reduce the costs incurred by jail
incarceration is to limit the number of people who enter and stay in jails.”).
241. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529–30 (1972) (“We, therefore, reject
both of the inflexible approaches—the fixed-time period because it goes
further than the Constitution requires; the demand-waiver rule because it is
insensitive to a right which we have deemed fundamental.”); see also Dickey
v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 49 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he equation
of silence or inaction with waiver is a fiction that has been categorically
rejected by this Court when other fundamental rights are at stake.”).
242. 398 U.S. 30, 50 (1970).
243. Id. at 49.
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that affirmative action by an accused is required to preserve—rather
than to waive—the right?”244 Justice Brennan was addressing the flaws
of the “demand-waiver rule,” but the same rationale can apply to the
effect of the assertion factor in the Barker test. If the presumption of
waiver is fundamentally unconstitutional, then why continue weighing
defendants’ inaction against them?
Additionally, the proposed test would create more consistency in
speedy trial jurisprudence and better equip defendants attempting to
prove speedy trial right violations. The proposed test would accomplish
this by eliminating confusion over what constitutes a proper assertion
of the right to a speedy trial and what should be considered sufficiently
“vigorous” or “timely.”245 Courts would still be able to consider the
vigorousness and timeliness of assertions, but as part of the analysis of
the remaining factors. Therefore, improved doctrines and patterns of
reasoning may emerge from case law. For example, courts could consider defendants’ failures to object to multiple continuances made by
prosecution as evidence that the “reason for delay” factor should weigh
in favor of the state. Courts could also consider the reasons for a defendant’s failure to object to a motion for continuance and decide whether
the defendant actually benefited or acquiesced to the delay. If a defendant did take advantage of the continuances, then the court could either
weigh “the prejudice to the defendant” factor in favor of the state, or
find the “reason for the delay” factor neutral if the delays were partially
caused by government negligence. The three-part test would take away
an unfair advantage given to the state and lead to more just speedy
trial jurisprudence.
C.

Restoring the Constitutional Right

A speedy trial test without the assertion factor would make decisions more consistent with the original intent of the Sixth Amendment.246
For example, consider a case like that of Jerry Hartfield, where an incarcerated defendant is awaiting a trial that never happens.247 The government allows a defendant to slip through the cracks, and due to indigence and mental incompetence, the defendant is completely unaware
of his rights.248 When addressing the defendant’s speedy trial right violation claim, the court would apply the proposed three-factor test.
Assuming that the length of the delay was sufficient to create a pre-

244. Id. at 50 (emphasis omitted).
245. See supra Part II.D (discussing how courts weigh the assertion factor).
246. See supra Part I.A (discussing the historical background of speedy trial
jurisprudence).
247. See supra notes 1–17 and accompanying text (discussing facts of Jerry
Hartfield).
248. Id.
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sumption in favor of the defendant, the court would only have to consider the reason for the delay and whether the defendant was prejudiced
by the delay. Under the basic facts of Hartfield—assuming no other
procedural problems—the reason for the delay would be a combination
of governmental negligence, the defendant’s incompetence and lack of
counsel, and possibly minor prosecutorial malfeasance. In light of these
facts, the court would have a hard time not weighing the reason for the
delay in favor of the defendant. Additionally, the court would have
difficulty weighing the prejudice factor in favor of the government;
Hartfield’s case was delayed so long that evidence was lost, and key
witnesses were unavailable.249 A court properly following the proposed
test would almost certainly dismiss the case.
Further, courts would lose the ability to refuse to dismiss cases
when defendants fail to meet the vague requirements of the assertion
factor and defendants would lose the burden of proving they really
wanted a speedy trial. This is undoubtedly more consistent with the
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that “the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial.”250 Under the proposed test, courts would
guarantee defendants are protected against the harms of waiting long
periods for trial, without imposing the undue burden of properly asking.
A three-factor test may be problematic because the court would
theoretically be letting more criminals go free, opening up a variety of
potential hazards for society. However, The U.S. Supreme Court has
stated that the government is responsible for bringing the accused to
trial.251 A test without the assertion factor would hold the government
accountable for that responsibility and still allow courts to prevent undeserving defendants from taking advantage of the system. For example, courts have considered acquiescence to delay as demonstrating
a lack of prejudice to the defendant.252 Expanding jurisprudence along
those lines would allow courts to restore the fundamental principles of
the constitutional right to a speedy trial by providing greater protection
to the accused. Unfortunately, this may give the court the difficult task
of defining what a constitutionally speedy trial really means. In order
to promote justice, courts should be prepared to meet the challenge.

249. Ford, supra note 17. It is possible that losing evidence would favor the
defendant, but without clear indication of what that evidence would show the
court must either weight the factor in favor of the defendant, or render the
factor neutral.
250. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
251. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 527 (1972) (“A defendant has no
duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the
duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process.”).
252. Ex parte Anderson, 979 So. 2d 777, 781 (Ala. 2007).
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Conclusion
Justice Powell unquestionably had good intentions for including
“assertion of the right to a speedy trial” as a factor in Barker test. The
factor has allowed courts to favor defendants who make a great deal of
effort in seeking trial and to disfavor defendants who wish to take advantage of the system. However, the assertion factor is not only unnecessary to speedy trial right analysis, it is also problematic in application. Due to unclear standards, courts use the assertion factor to deny
dismissal in cases where defendants’ constitutional rights are violated.
The Barker test’s assertion factor has also caused courts to deviate from
the intended meaning of the Sixth Amendment. Removing the assertion
factor from speedy trial analysis would allow courts to restore the intention behind, and meaning of, the Sixth Amendment, mitigate unjust
decisions, and ideally lead to improvements in the criminal justice
system.
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